Privacy guide
Fingerprint spoofing vs randomization: which strategy fits your goal
There are three ways to keep a fingerprint from following you. You can look like everyone else, look different on every site, or look like one stable person per profile. Each one protects against a different threat.
Direct answer
Fingerprint spoofing vs randomization comes down to stability. Randomization, such as Brave’s farbling, changes values per site and per session, so sites cannot link your visits by fingerprint. Persistent spoofing gives each profile one stable, realistic identity, so separate accounts stay apart and each looks like a normal returning visitor. Blending in, the third strategy, makes all users look alike, as Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser do. For anonymity, blending in is the strongest choice.
The three strategies
A fingerprint is the set of values your browser reveals, such as screen size, fonts and canvas output. Privacy tools change them in one of three ways.
Blending in makes every user report the same values. Tor Browser reports UTC as the timezone, a standard user agent per operating system and rounded window sizes. It also blocks canvas image reads. The Tor Project calls the result a “nearly identical” fingerprint. Mullvad Browser uses the same protections without the Tor network.
Randomization makes you look different to each site. Brave calls this farbling. It adds small noise to canvas, WebGL and Web Audio output, among other values. The seed changes per session, per site and per storage area. One site sees the same values all session, and new ones next session.
Persistent spoofing gives each browser profile its own complete set of values. They stay the same at every launch, with the profile’s own cookies and proxy. This is how antidetect browsers work. The goal is to look like a separate, ordinary user in each profile.
Spoofing, randomization and blending in compared
| Strategy | How it works | Example browsers | What it protects against | Weak points | Best for |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blending in | All users report the same or bucketed values. | Tor Browser, Mullvad Browser | Tracking by fingerprint. With the Tor network, tracking by IP too. | The crowd is only as large as the user base. Add-ons or custom settings can make you unique. Some sites block Tor. | Anonymity and reading without being linked |
| Randomization | Small noise per site and per session on chosen values. | Brave by default, Firefox for canvas since version 151 | Linking your visits across sites and sessions | Light noise can be detected. Values without noise still identify you. Sites you log in to see new values each session. | Everyday browsing with less tracking |
| Persistent spoofing | Each profile keeps one stored, realistic set of values, plus its own cookies and proxy. | Antidetect browsers, such as AliasMode | Linking separate profiles to each other | Each profile is recognizable on return visits, by design. Quality varies by vendor, so prefer open source you can inspect. | Long-lived identities that must stay apart |
Most privacy browsers mix strategies
Real browsers rarely use one strategy alone. Brave randomizes many values. Since version 1.93 in August 2026, it also gives every Brave user the same generic WebGL vendor and renderer strings. That part is blending in.
Firefox mixes too. Since Firefox 151 (2026), Standard mode adds noise to canvas reads, keyed per site and per session. Before 151, that noise came only in private windows and with Enhanced Tracking Protection set to Strict. Those two modes still go further. They also limit what sites learn about fonts and CPU cores.
Firefox’s about:config setting privacy.resistFingerprinting adds stronger, Tor-style protections and breaks more sites.
Crowd size matters for every strategy. Brave dropped its Strict fingerprinting mode in 2024, partly because the under 0.5% of users on it could stand out.
Which one fits you
| Your goal | Best fit | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Read and search without being identified | Tor Browser | A large crowd shares one fingerprint, and Tor hides your IP. |
| The same, faster, with a VPN you trust | Mullvad Browser with a VPN | The Tor Browser approach without the Tor network |
| Less tracking in daily browsing | Brave, or Firefox in Strict mode | Randomization breaks cross-site linking, and most sites still work. |
| Keep signed-in identities apart | Separate profiles with stable fingerprints, cookies and proxies | Each identity looks like one ordinary returning user. |
| Defend against a skilled, targeted adversary | Separate devices or virtual machines, often with Tor | A browser cannot hide the hardware it runs on. |
Where AliasMode fits
AliasMode uses persistent spoofing. It is a free, open-source desktop app for Windows, Mac and Linux. Each profile has its own data folder, its own proxy and its own fingerprint values from a stable seed. These include user agent, screen, timezone, fonts and WebGL renderer. With a proxy, timezone and language follow the proxy’s location.
AliasMode Chromium also adds per-profile canvas and WebGL noise from the same stable seed.
Frequently asked questions
Is randomization better than spoofing?
Neither is better in general. Randomization suits browsing you do not want linked. Persistent spoofing suits accounts you return to, where a fingerprint that changes every session can look like a new device. For anonymity, blending in beats both.
What is Brave farbling?
Farbling is Brave’s name for small random changes to values that fingerprinting scripts read, such as canvas and Web Audio output. The seed changes per session, per site and per storage area.
Does Firefox randomize fingerprints?
Partly. Since Firefox 151 (2026), every window adds noise to canvas reads, keyed per site and per session. Before 151, only private windows and Strict mode did. Those modes still go further and limit values such as CPU cores and fonts.
Why do test sites say Brave makes me unique?
Randomized values are new to the test site, so it calls them unique. Brave says this is expected. What matters is that the value changes between sites and sessions.
Does Tor Browser make everyone identical?
Nearly. The Tor Project says Tor Browser’s fingerprint is nearly identical across users, but “not perfect.” Extra add-ons or changed settings can make you unique.
Is an anti-fingerprinting browser enough to stay private?
No. Of these, only Tor Browser on the Tor network also hides your IP address. Logins, cookies, email addresses and payment details link you too.